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Interview Notes of Government Agents Under the Jencks Act
Congress enacted the Jencks Act 1 in response to the Supreme
Court's holding in Jencks v. United States. 2 The Act allows federal
criminal defendants to seek discovery of relevant statements previously made by government witnesses. 3 These "statements" enable
the defense to impeach government witnesses on cross-examination.4
The Act commands the prosecution, upon the defendant's request, to
produce any prior statement of a government witness after that witness has testified on direct examination. Failure to comply with the
court's order to produce the witness' prior statement results in exclusion of that witness' testimony from the record. 5
The Jencks Act spawned a great deal-of litigation, 6 much of
which concerns the statutory meaning of "statement." Congress defined "statement" as (1) written statements signed or otherwise
adopted by the witness, or (2) substantially verbatim recordings of
I. 18 u.s.c. § 3500 (1976).
2. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The Court held that in Federal criminal prosecutions, the government is required to produce "relevant statements or reports in its possession of government
witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at trial." 353 U.S. at 672.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1976) provides:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement
(as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any
such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall
order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
4. The Supreme Court has clearly espoused the value of the impeachment process in
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,667 (1957), and how "recorded" prior statements of the
witness promote this process: "Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value
for impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls
treacherous memory."
Commentators have also emphasized how important prior statements are to the defendant's effective cross-examination of a witness. See, e.g., Note, Protecting a .Defendant's Constitutional Rights: The Jencks Act and the Inadequacy of the Good Faith Exception, 59 B.U. L.
REV. 695, 708 (1979):
The most effective and most frequently employed method of impeachment is to use a
witness' prior inconsistent statements. Professor McCormick notes that such statements,
"having been made when memory was more recent and when less time for the play of
influence has elapsed are often inherently more trustworthy than the [trial] testimony itself.A limitation on the use ofsuch statements willprevent an ejfective cross-examination ofa
witness, and, absent other evidentiary concerns, is unconstitutional
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1976) provides:
If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under subsection
(b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such portion thereof as
the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness,
and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 430 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (giving a
sample of the number of cases litigated).
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an oral statement made by the witness. 7 The uncertainty concerning
the meaning of "statement" reflects the somewhat conflicting purposes8 of the Act: Congress sought both to "preserve the rights of
any defendant under due process of law," 9 and to dispel the notion
that defendants are entitled to a "broad or blind fishing expedition
among [government] documents . . . on the chance that something
impeaching might tum up." 10 Thus, the Act both reaffirms a defendant's right to relevant witness' statements, and limits this right by
protecting basic government interests. 11 Whether a particular document falls within the statutory definition of a statement depends
largely upon the interplay between these policies.
An issue that often arises is whether a government agent's rough
interview notes constitute a Jencks Act "statement." Typically, government agents take notes during interviews with prospective witnesses. Sometime following the interview, the agent prepares a
formal report 12 relying on the notes. Thereafter, the government destroys the notes. When the witness testifies at trial, and the defendant requests Jencks Act statements, the government only produces
the agent's formal report. 13 The practice of routinely destroying
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1976) provides:
The term "statement", as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section in relation
to any witness called by the United States, means - (I) a written statement made by said
witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement; or (3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or
a transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
Paragraph (3) was added to the Act in 1970. This subsection will not be discussed because it
has no relevance to the issues discussed in this Note.
8. That these purposes are somewhat conflicting is evident from the manner in which the
Jencks Act modifies the Jencks decision. In Jencks, the Supreme Court focused on the rights
of the defendant and concluded that justice required that he be able to view initially any witness statement in the possession of the government. 353 U.S. at 667-69. Fearing that through
this decision the Court had "opened [government) files to the criminal and thus afforded him a
Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national
secrets," 353 U.S. at 681-82 (Clark, J., dissenting), Congress reacted quickly by legislating
against this perceived evil. .While stressing that the act was intended to uphold the basic policies of the Jencks decision,see S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957),reprinted in 1957
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1861, 1862, Congress overturned the notion that a defendant
has a right to inspect the documents himself. The Act delegates this function to the court by
providing for an in camera inspection of arguably relevant documents. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(c) (1976).
9. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 8, at 2.
10. Id
11. Such governmental interests include protection of vital national secrets or other confidential information which may be included in its files. See, e.g., 103 CONG. REC. 15,918
(1957) (statement of Sen. Hruska): "Examination of the full files would also divulge investigation and law-enforcement techniques, as well as sources of intelligence. All of these things
would be harmful to the cause of good government."
12. FBI formal reports are FD-302 reports. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421,
425-28 (D.C. Cir. 1975), for a discussion of the nature of these notes.
13. The final report prepared by a government agent who testifies as a government witness
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rough interview notes raises the question whether the Jencks Act requires the government to retain and produce 14 the notes an agent
takes during an interview with a government witness.
Most courts that have considered the issue have concluded that
the Jencks Act does not require the government to retain and produce rough interview notes. 15 This Note examines the language and
purpose of the Act to determine whether interview notes should be
considered Jencks Act statements. Part I examines the policy underlying the Jencks Act and argues that the majority position sanctioning pre-trial destruction of interview notes conflicts with these
statutory purposes. Part II discusses the statutory language and argues that the status of the witness as a government agent or a private
individual determines the applicable section of the Act. This Part
then analyzes the proper operation of the statute in both contexts.
The Note concludes that in both situations, a statutory 16 duty exists
is a Jencks Act statement. See Clancy v. United States, 365 U.S. 312 (1961); United States v.
Sink, 586 F.2d 1041, 1051 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cleveland, 477 F.2d 310, 316 (7th
Cir. 1973); Lewis v. United States, 340 F.2d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 1965); Mims v. United States,
332 F.2d 944, 948 (10th Cir. 1964) (government conceded point); United States v. McCarthy,
301 F.2d 796, 797-99 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Sheer, 278 F.2d 65, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1960);
Karp v. United States, 277 F.2d 843, 848-49 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Berry, 277 F.2d
826, 828 (7th Cir. 1960). But see United States v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Long, 468 F.2d 755, 756 n.l (8th Cir. 1972) (both holding that agent's report
need not be produced even though he testified at trial).
14. If interview notes fell within the Act's definition of a statement, then the government
has a duty to preserve them. "The Jencks Act is no less violated by the destruction of a statement than by its non-production. To hold otherwise would create an exception as broad as the
Act itself." United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372, 377 (9th Cir. 1976).
Many government agencies have regulations (either formal or informal) calling for the
destruction of interview notes after a formal report has been prepared, although some agencies
have discontinued this practice due to decisions condemning such regulations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harrison, 524
F.2d 421, 427-28 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The government has not, however, willingly adopted such
procedures: "We believe this added burden on law enforcement is unnecessary and should
eventually be declared such in order that resources soon to be dedicated to the preservation of
rough notes can be better used." United States v. Vella, 562 F.2d 275,276 n.l (3d Cir. 1977),
Similarly, this Note does not assume that the adoption of procedures to preserve rough notes
by soine agencies has resolved the issue. The question remains whether the Act requires such
procedures for all government agencies.
15. In fact, only the D.C., Third and Ninth Circuits have held that there is a duty to retain
notes. See United States v. Vella, 562 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Harris, 543
F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In the
other circuits "the FBI practice of destroying rough interview notes has generally been sanctioned by the courts in cases involving Jencks Act issues . . . ." 543 F.2d at 1251.
For a sample of the majority approach,see, e.g., United States v. Martin, 565 F.2d 362 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Hurst, 510 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Mechanic,
454 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 929 (1972); United States v. Covello, 410
F.2d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969); United States v. Spatuzza,"331 F.2d 214
(7th Cir. 1964).
16. This Note focuses on the statutory duty to retain interview notes. Some courts, see,
e.g., United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and commentators, see,
e.g., Wexler, 'Ine Constitutional .Disclosure .Duty and the Jencks Act, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. R.Ev. 206
(1966); Note, supra note 4; Comment, Judicial Response to Govemmental Loss or .Destruction of
Evidence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1972); Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate
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to retain and, in most cases, produce rough interview notes.
I.

ROUTINE DESTRUCTION OF ROUGH INTERVIEW NOTES
CONTRAVENES THE POLICIES UNDERLYING
THE JENCKS ACT

With the adoption of the Jencks Act, Congress responded to perceived ''widespread misinterpretations and popular misunderstandings of the [Jencks] opinion." 17 The Act has a dual purpose: (1) to
prevent blind fishing expeditions into sensitive government files in
search of impeaching materials; 18 and (2) to insure that "the Government which prosecutes an accused [recognizes its] duty to see that
justice is done [by not depriving] the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense." 19 Rough interview notes, viewed
in light of these goals, should be considered Jencks Act materials.
Three major reasons support this conclusion. First, routine destruction of interview notes does not materially advance the statutory
purpose of preventing "blind .fishing expeditions." Interview notes
are specifically identifiable documents, and comprise a "well-delineated category of materials."20 The inclusion of these notes within the
ambit of the Jencks Act neither entitles a defendant "to rove at will
through Government files," nor risks disclosure of sensitive government information.21 Accordingly, the courts should not deem a discovery request for such a discrete and precisely identifiable
Police Investigation: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N. Y:u. L. REV. 835 (1978), have suggested that
suppression of interview notes may violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. This
line of reasoning is based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process . • . ,") It is
not clear whether the Supreme Court would adopt this approach for interview notes. See
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1959), stating in dicta that the Jencks Act
should be the exclusive vehicle for production of statements in the government's possession.
Bui see Brennan, J., concurring: "I see no necessity in the circumstances of this case which
calls for a decision whether § 3500 is the sole vehicle whereby production of prior statements
of government witnesses to government agents may be made to the defense." 360 U.S. at 361.
Although the Supreme Court has not fully addressed the relationship between the Jencks Act
and Brady, co=entators have discussed the issue. See, e.g., Wexler, supra, at 211; Note,
supra note 4, at 710-11.
17. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 8, at 3.
18. Id at 2-3.
19. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. at 670-71 (quoting from.United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. I, 12 (1953)).
20. United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 428 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
21. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that neither the Act nor the Jencks opinion
denies the government any privilege it might otherwise claim, and that the Act specifically
provides for in camera inspection of statements whose relevance to the witness' testimony the
government contests. The trial judge, under the Act, determines the sections of the statement
which are competent and relevant, and permits discovery of only those sections). Quite aside
from these safeguards built into the Act, it is difficult to visualize information contained in the
rough notes, but not the final report, of sufficient importance to provoke concern for the integrity of the investigative record, unless the agents deliberately or unconsciously censor the interview record.
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document a "broad or blind fishing expedition."22
The specific statutory purpose of preventing adverse general reviews of government investigative files reflects Congressional sensitivity to the more general need to minimize the administrative
burden of enforcing the criminal law. Despite contrary assertions by
the government, however, mandatory retention of rough interview
notes would impose only a minimal additional administrative responsibility on law enforcement agencies. 23 Government agents
presently incorporate their rough notes into formal reports, which
routinely are retained. The filing of even extensive interview notes,
attached to the final report, would not intolerably burden the administrative capacities of federal agencies. 24 More importantly, as distinct from the need to preserve the integrity of sensitive government
information, "administrative convenience has traditionally fared
poorly as an asserted justification for government action infringing
important rights of individuals . . . . [T]he minimal burden here
does not outweigh the significant values to be served by preservation"25 of interview notes.
Second, retention of interview notes may prove essential to the
vindication of a defendant's Jencks Act rights. 26 The Jencks court
stressed that access to statements made by a government witness
before "time dulls treacherous memory" 27 may be crucial to the impeachment process. Courts that sanction the destruction of interview
notes therefore must assume that all government agents fully and
accurately incorporate their notes into formal reports, 28 thus preserving the statements for the defendant. 29 This assumption, however, is
22. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418-19 (1953).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421,429 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Government
argued that "preservation of FBI agents' rough notes will impose an intolerable administrative
burden" on the Bureau); hut see United States v. Comulada, 340 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 978 (1965) ("[E]very consideration of efficiency and economy would seem to
require the destruction of such fragmentary memoranda as soon as they are no longer
needed.").
24. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("We are not convinced that addition of a page or two for each witness creates insuperable space problems. . . .
[T]here is plainly no need for elaborate new systems to keep track of the notes. They could
simply be stapled to the . . . reports.").
25. United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
26. See Note, supra note 4, at 708 ("A limitation on the use of [a witness' prior inconsistent] statements will prevent an effective cross examination of a witness . . .") (footnote
omitted).
27. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957).
28. Even courts that have not imposed a duty on the government to preserve notes, have
noted that it would be in the government's interest to do so. See United States v. Anzalone,
555 F.2d 317,321 (2d Cir. 1977) (''To protect itself against the day when the witness may claim
that the typed summary (which is discoverable ...), was contrary to what he said, we think
that the FBI would be well advised, however, to retain the handwritten notes until the prosecution is terminated."). See also United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir. 1978).
29. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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unrealistic. Even the most conscientious agents may err in transferring information from interview notes to final reports. 30 And it is not
"beyond the bounds of possibility that a report [may] be distorted
because of overzealousness on the part of the agent preparing it."31
Destruction of rough interview notes, however, deprives the defendant of the opportunity to prove, and perhaps even to learn of, inaccuracies in the formal report. 32 Accordingly, routine destruction of
interview notes abridges a defendant's Jencks Act rights.
Routine destruction of interview notes, finally, deprives the court
of its duty to determine whether the notes are discoverable under the
Jencks Act. The Act explicitly provides in camera inspection for
materials the government claims that it need not produce. 33 Evaluation of a defendant's Jencks Act rights lies properly within the purview of the courts, not oflaw enforcement agents. 34 The government
effectively usurps this important judicial function when it decides
unilaterally to destroy relevant materials before trial. Neither the
purposes behind the Act, nor its language, contemplates favoring the
government in this manner.
The statutory provision for judicial determination of the defendant's right to materials under the Act effectively negates any argument in defense of routine destruction of interview notes based on
the merits of their ultimate discovery. Insofar as discovery of rough
interview notes would somehow offend critical governmental interests, the courts can prevent this result by denying discovery on a
case-by-case basis, whenever in camera inspection reveals a sound
basis for such fears. The only legitimate argument against the retention of interview notes is therefore the claim of administrative inconvenience. As earlier discussed, mandatory retention of interview
30. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
31. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
32. Without interview notes, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to show an inconsistency between the notes and the formal report. United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 432
(D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Without the notes, ... [the defendant] is reduced to trying to show a discrepancy in the [formal] report by cross-examining the witness who was the subject of the
interview, a witness who was prepared for testifying, not by reading the rough notes, by using
the [formal] report. There could hardly be a less auspicious setting for eliciting testimony that
will cast doubt on the accuracy of the interview report."). See United States v. Anzalone, 555
·F.2d 317,321 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1249-52 (9th Cir. 1976);
Co=ent, supra note 16, at 549-51. Placing this burden on the defendant has been criticized.
See Note, supra note 4, at 717; Co=ent, supra note 16, at 548-52.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1976) provides:
If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the
witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such statement for the inspection
of the court in camera.
34. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[T)he ultimate
decision is not . . . for the agent to make. The decision on discoverability is emphatically a
judicial decision").
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notes implicates this concern too slightly to justify the risk to defendants' statutory rights posed by the routine destruction policy.
II.

DISCOVERY OF ROUGH INTERVIEW NOTES

The first Part of this Note advanced the argument, derived from
the policies animating the Jencks Act, that the statute imposes the
duty to retain rough interview notes on government law enforcement
agencies. This Part examines the defendant's right to actual discovery of interview notes in light of the statuto!}' Janguage. This language suggests an important distinction between requests for interview notes, depending on whether the notes will be used to impeach
the testimony of a government agent or a private citizen. In both
cases, however, interview notes will prove generally, if not universally, discoverable.
Subsection (e) of the Jencks Act defines "statement" as (1) "a
written statement made by [the] witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;" 35 or (2) a recording or transcript
"which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made
by [the] witness ... and recorded contemporaneously with the making of [the statement]."36 Most courts, however, fail to analyze carefully the statutory language and merely state summarily that "the
Jencks Act . . . imposes no duty . . . to retain rough notes when
their contents are incorporated into official records and [the notes
have been destroyed] in good faith." 37 Specifically, most courts fail
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(l) (1976). A written statement need not be signed, nor even written by the witness to be producible under the Jencks Act. See Campbell v. United States, 373
U.S. 487, 492 n.6 (1963).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(2) (1976).
37. United States v. Terrell, 474 F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States v.
Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1116 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jiminez, 484 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Lane, 479 F.2d 1134, 1136 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973),
citing United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (6th Cir. 1970).
The majority reliance on good faith is misplaced. See United States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d
523,529 (6th Cir. 1965) ("[W]e see no need to characterize the destruction of these statements
as in good faith or bad - as honest or corrupt . . . . The fact that the agent who destroyed
them may have done so [in good faith] does not alter the nature of the sanctions imposed by
the statute."). But see Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961), where the defendant
sought materials relating to the testimony of government informers. The FBI admitted that
notes covering oral reports of the informers had been destroyed. The Supreme Court remanded the case, stating that if the notes were made solely to transfer data to receipts to be
signed by the informants, and "they were [later] destroyed by the agents in goodfaith and in
accord with their normal practice, . . . their destruction did not . . . deprive petitioner of any
right." 368 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
Killian, however, is distinguishable because the witness signed the receipts, thereby adopting them within (e)(l). Interview notes and formal reports, however, are not usually adopted
by the witness. Thus, there is not the added safeguard that everything in the notes was put into
the report. Further, the government emphasized that nothing in the receipts (and, therefore,
the notes upon which these receipts were based) related to the direct Jestimony of the witness
as required by the Act. This is not an argument that can be maintained in the interview note
situation, as generally the formal report will directly relate to the witness' testimony.
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to recognize-that proper application of the Jencks Act to rough interview notes requires different analyses depending on who the witness
is.3s
When a defendant seeks discovery of rough interview notes
under the Jencks Act, the trial court must decide whether the notes
constitute a statement previously made by the witness. Typically, a
private individual testifies at trial, and the defendant seeks the notes
prepared by the government agent during an investigative interview.39 Occasionally, the government agent will testify in court concerning a particular interview or other knowledge he acquired
during the course of the government's investigation.40 In this case,
the defendant may seek the rough interview notes as a Jencks Act
statement made by the agent. Whether the witness whose statement
is sought is a government agent or a private individual determines
the applicable section of the statute.
For example, when a defendant seeks interview notes to impeach
a government agent, subsection (e)(2) does not apply because the
agent made no oral statement that could have been recorded. Interview notes may, nonetheless, constitute a Jencks Act statement if the
agent adopted or approved the interview notes under subsection
(e)(l).41 Similarly when a defendant seeks interview notes to impeach a private individual who has testified at trial, the witness will
have made an oral statement, and therefore, the notes must fulfill the
substantially verbatim requirement to be discoverable under subsection (e)(2). 42 Subsection (e)(l) will rarely apply when the witness is a
private individual because the witness usually does not adopt or approve the agents notes.43 The following sections examine the appli38. See United States v. Martin, 565 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1978), where the court stated summarily that if destruction was in good faith there was no reversible error. 565 F.2d 363-64.
Later, the Fifth Circuit realized that there may be some significance in whether the witness is a
government agent or private individual. See United States v. Cole, 634 F.2d 866, 868 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1981) (where the court noted that its prior holdings denying that defendants had a right to
interview notes of an agent who test!fied at trial "necessarily determined only that the notes
were not (e)(l) statements." The court agreed with the defendant that there was a separate
(e)(2) argument when a nonagent was the witness, although it ultimately rejected this claim.
634 F.2d at 868-69).
39. This is the situation Congress primarily anticipated when it enacted the Jencks Act.
See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635,638 (4th Cir. 1959) ("In the Jencks [sic] case,
itself, the defendant sought the production of FBI reports in order to obtain material with
which to cross examine an FBI informer, and clearly that was the situation which Congress
had principally in mind when it enacted the Jencks Act.").
40. See United States v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684,690 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J., dissenting).
41. See notes 44-56 infta and accompanying text.
42. See notes 57-69 infta and accompanying text.
43. Of course, there are occasions when a nonagent will read over an agent's interview
notes and will sign or express his "adoption" of such notes in some other manner. In this
situation, the notes are clearly producible under (e)(l). See Campbell v. United States, 373
U.S. 487 (1963). However, this Note is primarily concerned with the more common situation
in which the interviewee has not approved the agent's notes in any manner.
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cation of the Jencks Act to interview notes in light of this distinction.
A. The Government Agent Witness
When the witness is the government agent who conducted the
interview, subsection (e)(I) defines the scope of discoverability under
the statute.44 Interview notes will constitute a Jencks Act statement
if the agent has adopted or approved them in some manner. The
courts have not clearly identified what constitutes adoption or approval of interview notes within the meaning of the Jencks Act.4 s
Persuasive reasons exists, however, to view interview notes as approved or adopted by the agent. They contain the agents own written record of what occurred during the interview. These notes
constitute the agent's primary factual resource for preparing the formal report, which itself often proves discoverable under the Jencks
Act.46 Because the reports, presumably, fully incorporate the interview notes,47 the defendant is entitled to all the information contained in the notes via the formal reports.48 In short, because the
agent bases the formal report on the interview notes "it would be an
exercise in illogic to conclude that he had adopted the former but not
the latter."49 Accordingly, where an agent relies on the interview
notes to prepare a Jencks Act statement, the notes themselves become Jencks Act statements.
The government may argue that destruction of interview notes
does not violate the Jencks Act because the reports preserve all the
information in the notes, which therefore merely duplicate the report.so However, as noted earlier, the determination of whether the
Jencks Act appli,es to particular documents properly belongs to the
trial court.s 1 In fact, the most compelling-case for judicial determination of this question occurs when the defendant seeks to impeach
44. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
45. Many courts have been liberal in their interpretations of what constitutes adoptions.
See Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 492 n.6 (1963), and cases cited therein. The
Campbell court held that a private individual had adopted aformal report where the private
individual had read and approved the interview notes which were used to prepare the formal
report and were subsequently destroyed.
46. See, e.g., Karp v. United States, 277 F.2d 843, 848-49 (8th Cir. 1960); Holmes v. United
States, 271 F.2d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1959).
47. The government often argues that interview notes are fully incorporated into formal
reports, and the notes need not be retained. See note 50 iefra.
48. See note 14 supra.
49. United States v. Walden, 465 F. Supp. 255,261 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The court, on remand,
held that a government agent, who had adopted a formal report, had also adopted earlier
drafts of the report which had been sent to his supervisor. The court held that the drafts were
Jencks Act statements in part because drafts and the report were identical. Though formal
reports and interview notes are not identical,._~ reasoning is applicable to them because all of
the information contained in the notes had Been incorporated into the formal report.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
51. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
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the very agent who contends that the destroyed notes would not be
helpful for impeachment purposes.52 In such a case, the government
agent's unilateral decision to destroy the primary source of impeaching evidence clearly threatens the defendant's Jencks Act rights.
The government may further argue that if fully incorporating interview notes into the final report constitutes adoption, an agent's
failure to incorporate completely the notes into the report precludes
adoption of the notes. That is, because agents may exclude some
.information contained in their notes from the reports, they have implicitly declined to adopt the notes themselves. Yet, the majority approach, which allows destruction of interview notes, rests on the
assumption that the agent has fully incorporated the notes into official records. 53 The government's admission that the defendant has
not been supplied "the very same information contained in the statement which has been destroyed,"54 establishes an independent violation of the Jencks Act. At the very least, the trial court, and not the
agent whose testimony is at issue, should determine whether the witness somehow disapproved his own interview notes at the report
stage.
In sum, when the government fails to produce an agent's rough
interview notes after the agent testifies at trial, the trial court should
strike the agent's testimony from the record. 55 Therefore, because
"law enforcement agents . . . are often called to tesitify,"56 government agencies should discontinue the practice of routine destruction
of interview notes, or risk the imposition of the Jencks Act sanctions.
B.

The Nonagent Witness

When a private individual testifies, subsection (e)(2) of the Act
may require production of the interviewer's notes as a contemporaneous recording of the witness' statement.57 To constitute a statement within subsection (e)(2), the notes must be a "substantially
verbatim" recording of the witness' words. Because the Act does not
define "substantially verbatim" the proper application of this re52. See United States v. Johnson, 521 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that "the
question of whether an otherwise producible statement is useful for impeachment must be left
to the defendant. . . . Certainly the answer should not rest with the very witness whose testi•
mony the defendant seeks to impeach."); United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180,202 (4th Cir.
1964), qffd., 383 U.S. 169 (1966) ("Where the agent testifies to matter he claims not to be in the
notes and the defendant insists on a different version, an issue arises which may not be satisfactorily resolved in the absence of the original notes. If the notes were available, they might
confirm or refute one version or the other.").
53. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 1965).
55. See note 5 supra.
56. United States v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684, 690 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J., dissenting).
57. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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quirement depends on an examination of the purposes behind it. 58
The Supreme Court has noted that Congress intended subsection
(e)(2) to prevent impeachment of a witness with a statement that is
not his own.59 Thus, the requirement limiting Jencks Act -statements
to "substantially verbatim" recorcli.n,gs is intended to allow production of only those statements that fairly reflect the interviewee's actual words. 60
When the government has not destroyed the interview notes,
their classification as "substantially verbatim" lies uniquely within
the competence of the trial court, whose decision will survive appellate review unless clearly erroneous.61 In reaching its decision, the
court must consider the risk that selective and episodic notes62 will
enable the defense to impeach the witness unfairly. Because only
statements which can "properly be called the witness' own words
should be made available to the defense for purposes of impeachment,"63 the government need not produce inaccurate or incomplete
interview notes.
While the differences between one set of notes and the next preclude conclusive generalizations, the willingness of the courts to require the preservation and production of the formal reports under
subsection (e)(2)64 suggests a powerful comparison in favor of classi58. One argument for a narrow construction of the "substantially verbatim" requirement
concerns the specific means of recording approved ofin subsection (e)(2) of the Act, i.e., electrical recording, stenography, etc. Adherence to a view of congressional intent predicated on
ejusdem generis might lead to the conclusion that only such word-for-word transcriptions fall
within the ambit of the statute. The required production of formal investigative reports would
suggest that the courts have rejected this approach in favor of a more liberal interpretation.
See note 64 i,!fra. In keeping with the statutory purpose to avoid unfairness to the witness,
rather than to set a standard of academic accuracy, "[t]he phrase .'substantially verbatim' does
not mean 'precisely verbatim' though the writing must not contain the co=ents, impressions,
or opinions of the agent." NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir.
1967). See also Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v.
McKeever, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959).
59. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959).
60. The Palermo court denied production of an agents 600-word memorandum su=arizing parts of a three and one-half hour interview. The court held that it would be "grossly
unfair to allow the defense to use statements to impeach a witness which could not fairly be
said to be the witness' own . . . ." 360 U.S. at 350.
61. Campbell v. United States (Campbell II), 373 U.S. 487, 492-93 (1963); United States v.
Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979); United States v. Thomas,
282 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1960).
62. See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 126 (1976) (Powell, J., ~ncurring).
63. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959).
64. "These reports are generally provided routinely at trial as Jencks material, albeit excised to delete the conclusion of the interviewing agent." United States v. Narciso, 446 F.
Supp. 252, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The court noted that the 302 forms presumptively constitute
Jencks Act statements "as either statements approved by witnesses or substantially verbatim
recital of such statements." 446 F. Supp. at 269.
Indeed, the justification offered for refusing to apply the Jencks Act sanctions in cases of
routine good faith destruction of the notes depends on the availability of the interview reports.
See United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 929
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fying interview notes as Jencks Act "statements." A determination
that the report provides a substantially verbatim recording of the
witness' words entitles the defense to the agent's formal report. 65
Courts that deny the same treatment to interview notes must assume
that the notes are less reliable sources of an interviewee's words.
These reports, however, often are prepared days after the interview,
and contain the "agent's narrative account of the witness's statement,
prepared partly from the rough notes and partly from the agent's
recollection of the interview." 66 An agent may attempt to capture
the essence of his notes in subsequent reports, but he enjoys no guarantee of success in this endeavor. When the agent drafts a formal
report, he may reflect back on the interview with additional information and a different perspective, and may emphasize different aspects
of the interview. 67 Similarly, the agent may overlook parts of his
notes entirely or fail to appreciate their importance when he drafts
the report. 68 Accordingly, interview notes may reflect the witness'
(1972) ("Here, it appears the notes were destroyed in good faith in the course of normal procedure and only after they had been substantially incorporated into the typed summaries which
wereproduced." (emphasis added)); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536,545 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969) ("Absent an indication that the notes were destroyed for an improper purpose or that the handwritten data was not preserved in the formal reports /he reports
salisfytherequirementsof§ 3500. ") (emphasis added); United States v. Spatuzza, 331 F.2d 214,
218 (7th Cir. 1964) (''The agents testified, however, that the reports furnished defendants accurately reflected these notes . . . .").
65. One of the purposes of the final report is to "preserve the final copy of a witness statement whenever it is anticipated that the witness might testify in court." United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
66. United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
67. Consider where an agent interviews a prospective witness during the initial stages of an
investigation. Days later the investigation yields evidence incriminating the defep.dant. The
agent's interview with the first witness will take on a new significance. It is not unlikely that
the agent, in transferring his notes to a more formal report, will tend to emphasize those statements of the witness that support his new evidence. Similarly, he may under emphasize or
ignore those statements that would undercut his case. One can see how, in this situation, it
would be very helpful to the defendant to examine the original notes before a jury. This
possibility was discussed in United States v. Bundy, 472 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The initial description of an assailant by the victim or other eyewitness is crucial evidence,
and the notes taken of that description should be kept and produced. The formal written
police report of the crime does, of course, contain a description of the offender, but that
report is often prepared after a suspect is arrested and the danger that the description in
the formal report may be subconsciously influenced by the viewing of the suspect by the
author of the report is very great.
472 F.2d at 1267 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Carrasco, 537 F.2d 372, 377 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("It may be that the agent ... who adopts a final report from preliminary memoranda will tailor his observations to fit his conclusions ..•.").
68. See, e.g., United States v. Pope, 574 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1978).
In conference in the judge's chambers the Assistant United States Attorney represented
that he had inadvertently forgotten the statement because it related to an incident occurring after the conspiracy had ended and concerned matters which the government had no
intention originally of proving at the instant trial. During the course of the interrogation
of Blackmon, however, the government concluded that Blackman's knowledge concerning
the later events was relevant as bearing upon scheme and plan under Rule 404(b) ...•
S74 F.2d at 322.
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words more accurately and competently than the formal report. 69
Because these notes may be more accurate, preservation of interview
notes for in camera inspection may insure that a witness can only be
impeached by his own words. 70
Admitting that the notes may prove more accurate than the final
report, of course, does not amount to an argument for automatically
requiring production of either the notes or the report. 71 Vague or
fragmentary records of an interview, whether classified as "notes" or
a "report," would not conform to the substantially verbatim standard set by the Act. Similarly, some sections of the same document
may meet that standard, while other sections do not. The statute
wisely entrusts these judgments to the sound discretion of the trial
court, a discretion wholly frustrated when law enforcement agencies
routinely destroy rough interview notes. And insofar as formal investigative reports fulfill the statute's "substantially verbatim" requirement, rough interview notes a fortiori comply with that
criterion.
CONCLUSION

A careful analysis of the policies animating the Jencks Act suggests that the routine destruction of law enforcement agents' rough
interview notes seriously undermines the statutory purpose of preserving defendants' due process rights without furthering the statutory purpose of preventing fishing expeditions into government files.
The Act entrusts the balancing of these purposes to the trial court.
Such a judicial determination, after in camera review of the re69. Indeed it is arguable that the notes are a more reliable source of the non-agent's words
than the final reports because they will generally contain less of the agent's own interpretations
or opinions. In Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487,499 (1963), Justice Clark (dissenting)
noted that: "Every lawyer - indeed every layman experienced in the taking of interviews knows full well that it is extremely unlikely that any two narratives, even though preparedftom
identical notes, will be alike." (emphasis added).
70.. The structure of the notes themselves may contain valuable hints as to their adequacy.
For exall)ple, extensive use of quotation marks will indicate an agent's effort to record the
interviewee's exact words as opposed to the general nature of his responses. Similarly, notes
which are of a length that corresponds to the length of the interview may indicate a comprehensive treatment by the agent. See Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 286, 288-89 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
71. Occasionally, the courts will uphold a refusal by the government to provide copies of
the interview reports to the defense. United States v. Judon, 581 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Blackbum, 446 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972).
Where the reports do not contain "substantially verbatim" accounts of prior statements, this
result complies with the statute. But when the government refuses to provide reports to the
defense, the routine destruction of the original interview notes becomes especially difficult to
justify. Given the differences between the notes and the reports, the defense in such a situation
is denied both the procedural right to judicial determination of whether the notes amounted to
Jencks Act statements and the substantive information contained in the reports. Since the
availability of the reports underlies much of the courts' reluctance ·to require retention of the
original n_otes, a refusal to provide the defense with a copy of the government's own reports
should be met with considerable judicial skepticism. See note 64 supra.
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quested documents, would fully satisfy the government's interests
under the Act. But the routine destruction of interview notes by the
agencies themselves amounts to a usurpation of this judicial prerogative, a usurpation inimical to the purposes and provisions of the
statute.
The trial court's determination of whether the government must
produce interview notes will tum on the status of the witness as a
government agent or a private citizen. Where the defense seeks the
notes to impeach the testimony of a government agent, the court
should generally require production of the notes as statements approved or adopted by the witness under subsection (e)(1) of the Act.
Where the notes relate to the testimony of a private citizen, the court
must test the notes against the "substantially verbatim" standard of
subsection (e)(2). Given that formal reports derived from these notes
often fulfill this statutory requirement, the courts should compel the
parallel production of the notes themselves. Routine destruction of
rough interview notes is inconsistent with both the substantive provisions and the judicial procedure of the statute. The courts should
revise their approach accordingly.

